Nlow I vhave the vlurge to add random constants to vlthings
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Monday, May 17, 2010
I hate agreeing with Scalia
I also hate writing posts about sex offenders and child pornography because there's no way around it--it's really just kind of awkward. The things I do for you people. Anyway, I'm about to agree with Scalia AND simultaneously disagree with a law permitting extra confinement of sexual predators, so hopefully I still have readers tomorrow. (Hooray for class assignments and mandatory readers!)
So, getting down to business--today the Supreme Court handed down the ruling in U.S. v. Comstock. The Court upheld a law allowing extra confinement of individuals deemed to be "sexually dangerous," specifically allowing the civil confinement of "an individual who is currently “in the custody of the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons,” §4248, if that individual (1) has previously “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation,” (2) currently “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” and (3) “as a result of” that mental illness, abnormality, or disorder is “sexually dangerous to others,” in that “he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” §§4247(a)(5)–(6)."
Essentially, making it easier to lock up sex offenders--always a good thing right? Don't hate me, but in this case PLEASE NO. The Court justified this decision by deciding that Congress has "broad authority" to pass laws that are "rationally related" to its constitutional aims. Furthermore, the "choice of means" for carrying out its aims is left "primarily … to the judgment of Congress." Those are some SWEEPING statements if I ever heard any and expands Congress' authority by considerably more than any previous decision.
What would motivate the Court to go so far? I'm pretty sure it's got to be The Children. There is a definite cultural precedent that we must at all cost PROTECT THE CHILDREN, Constitutional rights and precedents be dammed. This fear is what lead the Court to criminalize the mere possession of child pornography in the much-criticized Osbourne v. Ohio. Innocent-seeming images that appeal to a pederast are illegal to possess, effectively creating the codified idea of a thoughtcrime--it is illegal to THINK that an image is arousing. Slippery. Slope.
I understand where this impulse comes from. Sexual abuse of a child is a heinous, horrifying crime. But I will argue that to ignore the rights of the perpetrator is worse.
Even if that makes me a conservative for the day.
So, getting down to business--today the Supreme Court handed down the ruling in U.S. v. Comstock. The Court upheld a law allowing extra confinement of individuals deemed to be "sexually dangerous," specifically allowing the civil confinement of "an individual who is currently “in the custody of the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons,” §4248, if that individual (1) has previously “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation,” (2) currently “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” and (3) “as a result of” that mental illness, abnormality, or disorder is “sexually dangerous to others,” in that “he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” §§4247(a)(5)–(6)."
Essentially, making it easier to lock up sex offenders--always a good thing right? Don't hate me, but in this case PLEASE NO. The Court justified this decision by deciding that Congress has "broad authority" to pass laws that are "rationally related" to its constitutional aims. Furthermore, the "choice of means" for carrying out its aims is left "primarily … to the judgment of Congress." Those are some SWEEPING statements if I ever heard any and expands Congress' authority by considerably more than any previous decision.
What would motivate the Court to go so far? I'm pretty sure it's got to be The Children. There is a definite cultural precedent that we must at all cost PROTECT THE CHILDREN, Constitutional rights and precedents be dammed. This fear is what lead the Court to criminalize the mere possession of child pornography in the much-criticized Osbourne v. Ohio. Innocent-seeming images that appeal to a pederast are illegal to possess, effectively creating the codified idea of a thoughtcrime--it is illegal to THINK that an image is arousing. Slippery. Slope.
I understand where this impulse comes from. Sexual abuse of a child is a heinous, horrifying crime. But I will argue that to ignore the rights of the perpetrator is worse.
Even if that makes me a conservative for the day.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Monday, May 10, 2010
Obvious topic day
So, there isn't really a good way to write a post on your blog about the Supreme Court this week without at least sort of mentioning Elena Kagan. (Believe me, I've been sitting here for an hour trying to come up with something shocking and interesting about the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) now officially makes the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for claims arising from medical care and related functions provided by Public Health Service personnel, thus barring Bivens actions. I have this vague feeling that Kagan is edging this breaking news off the tabloid covers. Weird.)
In the spirit of playing into the hype, letttt's gossip. No, not about that. Andrew Sullivan already went there. We've still got issues that are slightly less likely to get me flamed left, fortunately, so here's the off-of-the-Princess's-head list of reasons of why we could label Kagan as a terrible nominee.
1. She's Jewish. How unrepresentative of her. This would also result in a Court that is composed of 3 Jews and 6 Catholics (Hi Roe v. Wade!). No Protestants, in our 51% Protestant nation.
2. She's too liberal.
3. She's too conservative.
4. She's never been a judge. People like this have such bad track records. Like that loose cannon William Rehnquist. God.
5. She went to Yale. In a slightly more elitist-Ivy-League-style rehashing of Problem #1, this would mean that actually the entire Court went to Harvard or Yale Law Schools. (I hear there's some kind of Ivory Tower criticism around this. Not familiar with the subject or anything.)
I'm really going to officially not care, because I'm going to favor some controversial criteria for a Justice: STATS. Proof of raw brainpower. This is the uber-nerd job. This is where your charisma and your politics and your daddy's Skull and Bones connections do not count. This is ability to weigh Serious Issues.
And she's got it. Summa from Princeton, Magna from HLS, Law Review on grades, and she clerked for freaking Thurgood Marshall. I'm good with that. Kagan is the opposite of Obama's Harriet Miers.
What do you all think are important criteria to consider about potential Justices?
In the spirit of playing into the hype, letttt's gossip. No, not about that. Andrew Sullivan already went there. We've still got issues that are slightly less likely to get me flamed left, fortunately, so here's the off-of-the-Princess's-head list of reasons of why we could label Kagan as a terrible nominee.
1. She's Jewish. How unrepresentative of her. This would also result in a Court that is composed of 3 Jews and 6 Catholics (Hi Roe v. Wade!). No Protestants, in our 51% Protestant nation.
2. She's too liberal.
3. She's too conservative.
4. She's never been a judge. People like this have such bad track records. Like that loose cannon William Rehnquist. God.
5. She went to Yale. In a slightly more elitist-Ivy-League-style rehashing of Problem #1, this would mean that actually the entire Court went to Harvard or Yale Law Schools. (I hear there's some kind of Ivory Tower criticism around this. Not familiar with the subject or anything.)
I'm really going to officially not care, because I'm going to favor some controversial criteria for a Justice: STATS. Proof of raw brainpower. This is the uber-nerd job. This is where your charisma and your politics and your daddy's Skull and Bones connections do not count. This is ability to weigh Serious Issues.
And she's got it. Summa from Princeton, Magna from HLS, Law Review on grades, and she clerked for freaking Thurgood Marshall. I'm good with that. Kagan is the opposite of Obama's Harriet Miers.
What do you all think are important criteria to consider about potential Justices?
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Fishing fishing fishing
The Princess fell overboard and forgot to tell everyone that she was fishing.
In the mean time, Justices have been writing dissents about closing doors. Weirdest.
In the mean time, Justices have been writing dissents about closing doors. Weirdest.
Monday, April 26, 2010
Pagers, Post Office Precedent and p3ownage
The Court is expected to rule on City of Ontario v. Quon during this session, a case concerning police officers who maintain that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an allegedly unreasonable search involving review of text messages they sent and received on city-owned pagers. Although the city has a formal no-privacy policy that extends to messages sent on "City-owned computers and all associated equipment" , the officers were told by their supervisor that they were permitted to use the pagers for personal messages provided that they personally paid any extra cost incurred from those messages. During a standard audit of pager messages in order to determine if the city should pay for an increased character limit on pager messages, city workers discovered sexually-explicit text messages that had been sent when the officers were off-duty. The officers sued the city, alleging an invasion of privacy.
While the Court's opinion will certainly focus on the Fourth amendment issue at stake and reasonable expectations of privacy, I think it's possible that some far-reaching precedents could slip by relatively unnoticed.
This case concerns several technical questions. Is a pager a device similar enough to computers and e-mail systems that it might fall under an "associated" clause? And, more interestingly, does the fact that text messages are sent through a service provider mean that senders have a higher expectation of privacy? The lawyer for the petitioners draws a parallel between the service provider and the U.S. Post Office as a delivery service, maintaining that his clients had a higher expectation of privacy once the messages were entrusted to an intermediary.
It will be interesting to see how the Court rules, especially given the level of technical savvy the Justices presented during oral arguments. Chief Justice Roberts has caught some flak for asking about the "difference between a pager and e-mail?" (He did preface his statement with an admission that "maybe everyone else knows this." )
Personally, while I would love to see the creation of a secure email service that falls under the protection of federal law in the same way that stamped letters are legally shielded from prying eyes, I think that in the current environment, the officers could not reasonably had an expectation of privacy. Texts are easily forwarded in the same way as emails, and I've definitely seen and laughed at way too many emails that were forwarded faaaar beyond their original destinations. (With embarrassing ramifications for the original correspondents--Snopes has a good collection verified as true here.)
Do you expect that your emails and texts will remain private?
While the Court's opinion will certainly focus on the Fourth amendment issue at stake and reasonable expectations of privacy, I think it's possible that some far-reaching precedents could slip by relatively unnoticed.
This case concerns several technical questions. Is a pager a device similar enough to computers and e-mail systems that it might fall under an "associated" clause? And, more interestingly, does the fact that text messages are sent through a service provider mean that senders have a higher expectation of privacy? The lawyer for the petitioners draws a parallel between the service provider and the U.S. Post Office as a delivery service, maintaining that his clients had a higher expectation of privacy once the messages were entrusted to an intermediary.
It will be interesting to see how the Court rules, especially given the level of technical savvy the Justices presented during oral arguments. Chief Justice Roberts has caught some flak for asking about the "difference between a pager and e-mail?" (He did preface his statement with an admission that "maybe everyone else knows this." )
Personally, while I would love to see the creation of a secure email service that falls under the protection of federal law in the same way that stamped letters are legally shielded from prying eyes, I think that in the current environment, the officers could not reasonably had an expectation of privacy. Texts are easily forwarded in the same way as emails, and I've definitely seen and laughed at way too many emails that were forwarded faaaar beyond their original destinations. (With embarrassing ramifications for the original correspondents--Snopes has a good collection verified as true here.)
Do you expect that your emails and texts will remain private?
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